2. Article 28(1): If the competent authorities of both Contracting States so agree, they shall refuse contractual advantages to a particular person or transaction if those authorities consider that the granting of contractual services would constitute an abuse of the purpose and purpose of the contract. Contrary to the provisions of point 1, this refusal seems to require prior formal agreement between the States parties. This is the fifth of our contributions to Brazilian tax treaties. In each article, we provide an overview of a specific tax treaty between Brazil and a given foreign country, as well as commentary on Brazilian administrative or judicial pedaling cases that apply the treaty and highlight the impact of the OECD profit reduction and profit shifting (BEPS) project in its application. Unlike most Brazilian tax treaties (which settle residency issues in favour of the “place of efficient management”), Article 4(3) of the Treaty between Brazil and Mexico already contains a provision in line with the OECD Recommendation. Concerned about potential undisclosed foreign profits, hitherto protected by banking secrecy, the United States passed on March 18, 2010 what would subsequently change the entire landscape of cross-border exchange of tax information between sovereign nations: the Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act (FATCA). Typically, FATCA requires foreign financial institutions (“FFIs”) and foreign non-financial companies (“NFFEs”) to provide the U.S. government with financial information from U.S. taxpayers, with a penalty for non-compliance set at 30% of certain U.S. amounts. Under these agreements, residents (not necessarily citizens) of foreign countries are taxed at a reduced rate or are exempt from the United States. .